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3EDITORIAL NOTE
At the January 1977 meeting of its monthly Economic Seminar
series, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco was honored
to present Prof. Franco Modigliani, Immediate Past President
of the American Economic Association. In his paper, Prof.
Modigliani developed some of the themes which he had first
covered last September in his AEA Presidential Address, "The
Monetarist Controversy - Or, Should We Forsake Stabilization
Policies?" The Bank was doubly fortunate to obtain, as seminar
discussant, Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman, who was serving
as Visiting Scholar at this institution during the winter term.
This supplement to the Bank's Economic Review contains Prof.
Modigliani's lecture, Prof. Friedman's reply, the discussion
between the two and a floor discussion - plus, as an appendix,
Prof. Modigliani's AEA Presidential Address. The seminar was
chaired by Dr. Michael W. Keran, Vice President and Director
of Research for the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
4The Monetarist Controversy
Or, ShouId We Forsake Stabilization Policies?
American Economic Association Presidential Address
by Franco Modigliani*
In recent years and especially since the on-
set of the current depression, the economics
profession and the lay public have heard a
great deal about the sharp conflict between
"Monetarists and Keynesians" or between
"Monetarists and Fiscalists." The difference
between the two "schools" is generally held to
center on whether the money supply or fiscal
variables are the major determinants of aggre-
gate economic activity, and hence the most
appropriate tool of stabilization policies.
My central theme is that this view is quite
far from the truth, and that the issues in-
volved are of far greater practical import.
There are in reality no serious analytical dis-
agreements between leading Monetarists and
leading non-Monetarists. Milton Friedman was
once quoted as saying, "We are all Keyne-
sians, now," and I am quite prepared to
reciprocate that "we are all Monetarists" -
if by monetarism is meant assigning to the
stock of money a major role in determining
output and prices. Indeed, the list of those
who have long been Monetarists in this sense
is quite extensive, including among others
John Maynard Keynes as well as myself, as
is attested by my 1944 and 1963 articles.
In reality the distinguishing feature of the
Monetarist school and the real issues of dis-
agreement with non-Monetarists is not mone-
tarism but rather the role that should probably
be assigned to stabilization policies. Non-
Monetarists accept what I regard to be the
fundamental practical message of the General
Theory: that a private enterprise economy
using an intangible money needs to be sta-
bilized, can be stabilized, and therefore should
be stabilized by appropriate monetary and
fiscal policies. Monetarists by contrast take
the view that there is no serious need to
stabilize the economy; that even if there were
a need, it could not be done, for stabiliza-
tion policies would be more likely to increase
than to decrease instability; and, at least some
Monetarists would, I believe, go so far as to
hold that, even in the unlikely event that stabi-
lization policies could on balance prove bene-
ficial, the government should not be trusted
with the necessary power.
What has led me to address this contro-
versy is the recent spread of Monetarism, both
in a simplistic, superficial form and in the
form of growing influence on the practical
conduct of economic policy, which influence,
I shall argue presently, has played at least
some role in the economic upheavals of the
last three years.
In what follows then, I propose first to
review the main arguments bearing on the
need for stabilization policies, that is, on the
likely extent of instability in the absence of
such policies, and then to examine the issue
of the supposed destabilizing effect of pursu-
ing stabilization policies. My main concern
will be with instability generated by the tradi-
tional type of disturbances - demand shocks.
But before I am through, I will give some
consideration to the difficult problems raised
by the newer type of disturbance - supply
shocks.
* Presidential Address delivered at the eighty-ninth meeting of the American Economic Association, At/antic City,
New Jersey. Reprinted by permission from the American Economic Review, March /977.
27I. The Keynesian Case for Stabilization Policies
A. The General Theory
Keynes' novel conclusion about the need for
stabilization policies, as was brought out by
the early interpreters of the General Theory
(e.g., John R. Hicks; Modigliani, 1944),
resulted from the interaction of a basic con-
tribution to traditional monetary theory -
liquidity preference - and an unorthodox
hypothesis about the working of the labor
market - complete downward rigidity of
wages.
Because of liquidity preference, a change in
aggregate demand, which may be broadly
defined as any event that results in a change
in the market clearing or equilibrium rate of
interest, will produce a corresponding change
in the real demand for money or velocity of
circulation, and hence in the real stock of
money needed at full employment. As long as
wages are perfectly flexible, even with a con-
stant nominal supply, full employment could
and would be maintained by a change of wages
and prices as needed to produce the required
change in the real money supply - though
even in this case, stability of the price level
would require a countercyclical monetary policy.
But, under the Keynesian wage assumption the
classical adjustment through prices can occur
only in the case of an increased demand.
In the case of a decline, instead, wage rigidity
prevents the ne~essary increase in the real
money supply and the concomitant required
fall in interest rates. Hence, if the nominal
money supply is constant, the initial equili-
brium must give way to anew, stable one
characterized by lower output and by an in-
voluntary reduction in employment, so labelled
because it does not result from a shift in
nominal demand and supply schedules in
terms of real wages, but only from an in-
sufficient real money supply. The nature of
this equilibrium is elegantly captured by the
Hicksian IS-LM paradigm, which to our gen-
eration of economists has become almost as
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familiar as the demand-supply paradigm was
to earlier ones.
This analysis implied that a fixed money
supply far from insuring approximate stability
of prices and output, as held by the tradi-
tional view, would result in a rather unstable
economy, alternating between periods of pro-
tracted unemployment and stagnation, and
bursts of inflation. The extent of downward
instability would depend in part on the size
of the exogenous shocks to demand and in
part on the strength of what may be called
the Hicksian mechanism. By this I mean the
extent to which a shift in IS, through its
interaction with LM, results in some decline in
interest rates and thus in a change in income
which is smaller than the original shift. The
stabilizing power of this mechanism is con-
trolled by various parameters of the system.
In particular, the economy will be more un-
stable the greater the interest elasticity of
demand for money, and the smaller the inter-
est responsiveness of aggregate demand. Fin-
ally, a large multiplier is also destabilizing in
that it implies a larger shift in IS for a given
shock.
However, the instability could be readily
counteracted by appropriate stabilization poli-
cies. Monetary policy could change the nomi-
nal supply of money so as to accommodate
the change in real demand resulting from
shocks in aggregate demand. Fiscal policy,
through expenditure and taxes, could offset
these shocks, making full employment consis-
tent with the initial nominal money stock.
In general, both monetary and fiscal policies
could be used in combination. But because
of a perceived uncertainty in the response of
demand to changes in interest rates, and be-
cause changes in interest rates through mone-
tary policy could meet difficulties and sub-
stantial delays related to expectations (so-
called liquidity traps), fiscal policy was re-
garded as having some advantages.B. The Early Keynesians
The early disciples of the new Keynesian
gospel, still haunted by memories of the Great
Depression, frequently tended to outdo Keynes'
pessimism about potential instability. Concern
with liquidity traps fostered the view that the
demand for money was highly interest elastic;
failure to distinguish between the short- and
long-run marginal propensity to save led to
overestimating the long-run saving rate, thereby
fostering concern with stagnation, and to
underestimating the short-run propensity,
thereby exaggerating the short-run multiplier.
Interest rates were supposed to affect, at
best, the demand for long-lived fixed invest-
ments, and the interest elasticity was deemed
to be low. Thus, shocks were believed to pro-
duce a large response. Finally, investment
demand was seen as capriciously controlled by
"animal spirits," thus providing an important
source of shocks. All this justified calling for
very active stabilization policies. Furthermore,
since the very circumstances which produce a
large response to demand shocks also produce
a large response to fiscal and a small response
to monetary actions, there was a tendency to
focus on fiscal policy as the main tool to
keep the economy at near full employment.
C. The Phillips Curve
In the two decades following the General
Theory, there were a number of develop-
ments of the Keynesian system including
dynamization of the model, the stress on taxes
versus expenditures and the balanced budget
multiplier, and the first attempts at estimating
the critical parameters through econometric
techniques and models. But for present pur-
poses, the most important one was the
uncovering of a "stable" statistical relation
between the rate of change of wages and the
rate of unemployment, which has since come
to be known as the Phillips curve. This
relation, and its generalization by Richard G.
Lipsey to allow for the effect of recent inflation,
won wide acceptance even before an analytical
underpinning could be provided for it, in part
because it could account for the "puzzling"
experience of 1954 and 1958, when wages kept
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rising despite the substantial rise in unemploy-
ment. It also served to dispose of the rather
sterile "cost push"-"demand pull" controversy.
In the following years, a good deal of
attention went into developing theoretical
foundations for the Phillips curve, in particular
along the lines of search models (e.g. Edmund
Phelps et ai, 1970). This approach served
to shed a new light on the nature of unem-
ployment by tracing it, in the first place, to
labor turnover and search time rather than to
lack of jobs as such: in a sense unemployment
is all frictional - at least in developed coun-
tries. At the same time it clarified how the
availability of more jobs tends to reduce
unemployment by increasing vacancies and
thus reducing search time.
Acceptance of the Phillips curve relation
implied some significant changes in the
Keynesian framework which partly escaped
notice until the subsequent Monetarists' attacks.
Since the rate of change of wages decreased
smoothly with the rate of unemployment,
there was no longer a unique Full Employment
but rather a whole family of possible equili-
brium rates, each associated with a different
rate of inflation (and requiring, presumably,
a different long run growth of money). It
also impaired the notion of a stable under-
employment equilibrium. A fall in demand
could still cause an initial rise in unemploy-
ment but this rise, by reducing the growth
of wages, would eventually raise the real
money supply, tending to return unemployment
to the equilibrium rate consistent with the
given long run growth of money.
But at the practical level it did not lessen
the case for counteracting lasting demand
disturbances through stabilization policies
rather than by relying on the slow process
of wage adjustment to do the job, at the
cost of protracted unemployment and insta-
bility of price. Indeed, the realm of sta-
bilization policies appeared to expand in the
sense that the stabilization authority had the
power of choosing the unemployment rate
around which employment was to be stabilized,
though it then had to accept the associatedinflation. Finally, the dependence of wage
changes also on past inflation forced recog-
nition of a distinction between the short-
and the long-run Phillips curve, the latter
exhibiting the long-run equilibrium rate of
inflation implied by a maintained unemploy-
ment rate. The fact that the long-run tradeoff
between unemployment and inflation was
necessarily less favorable than the short-run
one, opened up new vistas of "enjoy-it-now,
pay-later" policies, and even resulted in an
entertaining literature on the political business
cycle and how to stay in the saddle by
riding the Phillips curve (see, e.g. Ray Fair,
William Nordhaus).
II. The Monetarists' Attack
A. The Stabilizing Power of the Hicksian
Mechanism
The Monetarists' attack on Keynesianism
was directed from the very beginning not at
the Keynesian framework as such, but at
whether it really implied a need for stabiliza-
tion. It rested on a radically different empirical
assessment of the value of the parameters
controlling the stabilizing power of the Hick-
sian mechanism and of the magnitude and
duration of response to shocks, given a stable
money supply. And this different assessment
in turn was feIt to justify a radical down-
grading of the practical relevance of the
Keynesian framework as distinguished from
its analytical validity.
Liquidity preference was a fine contribution
to monetary theory but in practice the re-
sponsiveness of the demand for money, and
hence of velocity, to interest rates, far from
being unmanageably large, was so small that
according to a well known paper by Milton
Friedman (1969), it could not even be detected
empirically. On the other hand, the effect
of interest rates on aggregate demand was large
and by no means limited to the traditional
fixed investments but quite pervasive. The
difficulty of detecting it empirically resulted
from focusing on a narrow range of measured
market rates and from the fact that while
the aggregate could be counted on to respond,
the response of individual components might
not be stable. Finally, Friedman's celebrated
contribution to the theory of the consumption
function (1957) (and my own work on the life
cycle hypothesis with Brumberg and others,
reviewed in Modigliani, 1975) implied a very
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high short-run marginal propensity to save
in response to transient disturbances to income
and hence a small short-run multiplier.
All this justified the conclusion that i)
though demand shocks might qualitatively work
along the lines described by Keynes, quanti-
tatively the Hicks mechanism is so strong that
their impact would be small and transient,
provided the stock of money was kept on a
steady growth path; ii) fiscal policy actions,
like other demand shocks, would have minor
and transitory effects on demand, while
changes in money would produce large and
permanent effects on money income; and,
therefore, iii) the observed instability of the
economy, which was anyway proving moderate
as the postwar period unfolded, was most
likely the result of the unstable growth of
money, be it due to misguided endeavors to
stabilize income or to the pursuit of other
targets, which were either irrelevant or, in the
case of balance of payments goals, should
have been made irrelevant by abandoning fixed
exchanges.
B. The Demise of Wage Rigidity and
the Vertical Phillips Curve
But the most serious challenge came in
Friedman's 1968 Presidential Address, build-
ing on ideas independently put forth also by
Phelps (1968). Its basic message was that,
despite appearances, wages were in reality
perfectly flexible and there was accordingly
no involuntary unemployment. The evidence
to the contrary, including the Phillips curve,
was but a statistical illusion resulting from
failure to differentiate between, price changes
and unexpected price changes.Friedman starts out by reviving the
Keynesian notion that, at any point of time,
there exists a unique full employment rate
which he labels the "natural rate." An unan-
ticipated fall in demand, in Friedman's com-
petitive world, leads firms to reduce prices
and also output and employment along the
short-run marginal cost curve - unless the
nominal wage declines together with prices.
But workers, failing to judge correctly the
current and prospective fall in prices, misin-
terpret the reduction of nominal wages as a
cut in real wages. Hence, assuming a posi-
tively sloped supply function, they reduce the
supply of labor. As a result, the effective
real wage rises to the point where the
resulting decline in the demand for labor
matches the reduced supply. Thus, output
falls not because of the decline in demand,
but because of the entirely voluntary reduc-
tion in the supply of labor, in response to
erroneous perceptions. furthermore, the fall
in employment can only be temporary, as
expectations must soon catch up with the
facts, at least in the absence of new shocks.
The very same mechanism works in the case
of an increase in demand, so that the
responsiveness of wages and prices is the same
on either side of the natural rate.
The upshot is that Friedman's model also
implies a Phillips-type relation between infla-
tion, employment or unemployment, and past
inflation - provided the latter variable is
interpreted as a reasonable proxy for expected
inflation. But it turns the standard explana-
tion on its head: instead of (excess) employ-
ment causing inflation, it is (the unexpected
component of) the nite of inflation that causes
excess employment.
One very basic implication of Friedman's
model is that the coefficient of price expecta-
tions should be precisely unity. This specifica-
tion implies that whatever the shape of the
short-run Phillips curve - a shape determined
by the relation between expected and actual
price changes, and by the elasticity of labor
supply with respect to the perceived real wage -
the long-run curve must be vertical.
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Friedman's novel twist provided a fresh
prop for the claim that stabilization policies
are not really needed, for, with wages flexible,
except possibly for transient distortions, the
Hicksian mechanism receives powerful rein-
forcement from changes in the real money
supply. Similarly, the fact that Full Employ-
ment was a razor edge provided new support
for the claim that stabilization policies were
bound to prove destabilizing.
C. The Macro Rational Expectations
Revolution
But the death blow to the already badly
battered Keynesian position was to come only
shortly thereafter by incorporating into
Friedman's model the so-called rational expec-
tation hypothesis, or REH. Put very roughly,
this hypothesis, originally due to John Muth,
states that rational economic agents will
endeavor to form expectations of relevant
future variables by making the most efficient
use of all information provided by past history.
It is a fundamental and fruitful contribution
that has already found many important appli-
cations, e.g., in connection with speculative
markets, and as a basis for some thoughtful
criticism by Robert Lucas (1976) of certain
features of econometric models. What I am
concerned with here is only its application to
macro-economics, or MREH, associated with
such authors as Lucas (1972), Thomas Sargent
(1976), and Sargent and Neil Wallace (1976).
The basic ingredient of MREH is the pos-
tulate that the workers of Friedman's model
hold rational expectations, which turns out to
have a number of remarkable implications:
i) errors of price expectations, which are the
only source of departure from the natural
rate, cannot be avoided but they can only
be short lived and random. In particular, there
cannot be persistent unemployment above the
natural rate for this would imply high serial
correlation between the successive errors of
expectation, which is inconsistent with rational
expectations; ii) any attempts to stabilize the
economy by means of stated monetary or
fiscal rules are bound to be totally ineffec-
tive because their effect will be fully dis-counted in rational expectations; iii) nor can
the government successfully pursue ad hoc
measures to offset shocks. The private sector
is already taking care of any anticipated
shock; therefore government policy could con-
ceivably help only if the government informa-
tion was better than that of the public, which
is impossible, by the very definition of rational
expectations. Under these conditions, ad hoc
stabilization policies are most likely to produce
instead further destabilizing shocks.
These are clearly remarkable conclusions,
and a major rediscovery - for it had all
been said 40 years ago by Keynes in a well-
known passage of the General Theory:
"If, indeed, labour were always in a
position to take action (and were to do so),
whenever there was less than full employment,
to reduce its money demands by concerted
action to whatever point was required to make
money so abundant relatively to the wage-
unit that the rate of interest would fall to
a level compatible with full employment, we
should, in effect, have monetary management
by the Trade Unions, aimed at full employ-
ment, instead of by the banking system." [267]
The only novelty is that MREH replaces
Keynes' opening "If" with a "Since."
If one accepts this little amendment, the
case against stabilization policies is complete.
The economy is inherently pretty stable -
except possibly for the effect of government
messing around. And to the extent that there
is a small residual instability, it is beyond
the power of human beings, let alone the
government, to alleviate it.
III. How Valid Is the Monetarist Case?
A. The Monetarist Model of Wage Price
Behavior
In setting out the counterattack it is con-
venient to start with the Monetarists' model
of price and wage behavior. Here one must
distinguish between the model as such and a
specific implication of that model, namely
that the long-run Phillips curve is vertical,
or, in substance, that, in the long run, money
is neutral. That conclusion, by now, does
not meet serious objection from non-Monetar-
ists, at least as a first approximation.
But the proposition that other things equal,
and given time enough, the economy will
eventually adjust to any indefinitely main-
tained stock of money, or nth derivative
thereof, can be derived from a variety of
models and, in any event, is of very little
practical relevance, as I will argue below.
What is unacceptable, because inconsistent
with both micro and macro evidence, is the
specific Monetarist model set out above and
its implication that all unemployment is a
voluntary, fleeting response to transitory mis-
perceptions.
One may usefully begin with a criticism
of the Macro-Rational Expectations model
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and why Keynes' "if" should not be re-
placed by "since." At the logical level,
Benjamin Friedman has called attention to
the omission from MREH of an explicit
learning model, and has suggested that, as
a result, it can only be interpreted as a
description not of short-run but of long-run
equilibrium in which no agent would wish
to recontract. But then the implications of
MREH are clearly far from startling, and
their policy relevance is almost nill. At the
institutional level, Stanley Fischer has shown
that the mere recognition of long term
contracts is sufficient to generate wage
rigidity and a substantial scope for stabi-
lization policies. But the most glaring flaw
of MREH is its inconsistency with the
evidence: if it were valid, deviations of
unemPloyment from the natural rate would be
small and transitory - in which case the
General Theory would not have been written
and neither would this paper. Sargent (1976)
has attempted to remedy this fatal flaw by
hypothesizing that the persistent and large
fluctuations in unemployment reflect merely
corresponding swings in the natural rate
itself. In other words, what happened to theu.s. in the 1930's was a severe attack of
contagious laziness! I can only say that,
despite Sargent's ingenuity, neither I nor, I
expect most others at least of the non-
Monetarist persuasion,. are quite ready yet.to
turn over the field of economic fluctuations
to the social psychologist!
Equally serious objections apply to Fried-
man's modeling of the commodity market as
a perfectly competitive one - so that the real
wage rate is continuouslyequated to the short-
run marginal product of labor - and to his
treatment of labor as a homogenous commo-
dity traded in an auction market, so that,
at the going wage, there never is any excess
demand by firms or excess supply by workers.
The inadequacies of this model as a useful
formalization of present day Western eco-
nomies are so numerous that only a few of
the major ones can be mentioned here.
Friedman's view of unemployment as a volun-
tary reduction in labor supply could at best
provide an explanation of variations in labor
force - and then only under the questionable
assumption that the supply function has a
significantly positive slope - but cannot
readily account for changes in unemployment.
Furthermore, cannot be reconciled with the
well known fact that rising unemployment is
accompanied .by a faB, not by a rise in
quits, nor with the role played by temporary
lay-offs to which Feldstein has recently called
attention. Again, his competitive model of the
commodity market, accepted also in the
General Theory, implies that changes in real
wages, adjusted for long-run productivity
trend, should be significantly negatively
correlated with cyclical changes in employment
and output and with changes in money wages.
But as early as 1938, John T. Dunlop showed
that this conclusion was rejected by some
eighty years of British experience and his
results have received some support in more
recent tests of Ronald Bodkin for the U.S.
and Canada. Similar tests of my own, using
quarterly data, provide striking. confirmation
that for the last two decades from the end
of the Korean war until 1973, the association
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of trend adjusted re<:l.l compensations of the
private nonfarm sector with either employ-
ment.or the change in nominal compensation
is prevailingly positive and very significantly
so.l
This evidence can, instead, be accounted
for by theoligopolistic pricing model -
according to which .price is determined by
long-run. minimum average . cost·upto ·a
mark-up reflecting entry preventingconsidera-
tions(cf. Modigliani, 1958).- coupled with
some lags in the adjustment of prices to
costs. This model implies that firms respond
to a change in <demand by endeavoring to
adjust output and employment, without signi-
ficant changes in prices relative to wages;
and the resulting changes in available jobs
have their initial impact not on wages but
rather on unemployment by way of lay-offs
and recalls and through changes in the level
of vacancies, and hence on the length of
average search time.
If, in the process, vacancies rise above a
critical level, or "natural rate," firms will
endeavor to reduce them by outbidding each
other, thereby raising the rate of change of
wages. Thus, as long as jobs and vacancies
remain above, and unemployment remains
below, some critical level which might be
labeled the "non-inflationary rate" (Modi-
gliani and Lucas Papademos, 1975), wages and
prices will tend to accelerate. If, on the other
hand, jobs fall below, and unemployment rises
above, the non-inflationary rate, firms finding
that vacancies are less than optimal - in the
limit the unemployed queuing outside the gate
will fill them instantly - will have an incen-
tive to reduce their relative wage offer. But
in this case, in which too much labor is
looking for too few jobs, the trend toward
a sustained decline in the rate of growth of
wages is likely to be even weaker than the
corresponding acceleration when too many
jobs are bidding for too few people. The main
reason is the non-homogeneity of labor.· By
far the largest and more valuable source
of labor supply to a firm consists of those
already employed who are not readily inter-changeable with the unemployed, and in
contrast with them, are concerned with pro-
tecting their earnings and not with reesta-
blishing full employment. For these reasons,
and because the first to quit are likely to be
the best workers, a reduction of the labor
force can, within limits, be accomplished more
economically, not by reducing wages to gener-
ate enough quits, but by firing or, when
possible, by lay-offs which insure access to a
trained labor force when demand recovers.
More generally, the inducement to reduce
relative wages to eliminate the excess supply
is moderated by the effect that such a reduc-
tion would have on quits and costly turnover,
even when the resulting vacancies can be
readily filled from the ranks of the unem-
ployed. Equally relevant are the consequences
in terms of loss of morale and good will,
in part for reasons which have been elaborated
by the literature on implicit contracts (cf.
Robert Gordon). Thus, while there will be
some tendency for the rate of change of
wages to fall, the more so the larger the
unemployment - at least in an economy
like the U.S. where there are no overpowering
centralized unions - that tendency is severely
damped.
And whether, given an unemployment rate
significantly and persistently above the non-
inflationary level, the rate of change of wages
would, eventually, tend to turn negative and
decline without bound or whether it would
tend to an asymptote is a question that I
doubt the empirical evidence will ever answer.
The one experiment we have had - the Great
Depression - suggests the answer is negative,
and while I admit that, for a variety of
reasons, that evidence is muddied, I hope that
we will never have the opportunity for a
second, dean experiment.
In any event, what is really important for
practical purposes is not the long-run equili-
brium relation as such, but the speed with
which it is approached. Both the model sketched
out and the empirical evidence suggest that
the process of acceleration or deceleration of
wages when unemployment differs from the
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non-inflationary rate will have more nearly
the character of a crawl than of a gallop.
It will suffice to recall in this connection that
there was excess demand pressure in the U.S.
at least from 1965 to mid 1970, and during
that period the growth of inflation was from
some 1.5 to only about 5.5 percent per year.
And the response to the excess supply pressure
from ·lllid 1970 to early 1973, or from late
1974 to date was equally sluggish.
B. The Power of Self-Stabilizing
Mechanisms: The Evidence from
Econometric Models
There remains to consider the Monetarists'
initial criticism of Keynesianism, to wit, that
even without high wage flexibility, the system's
response to demand shocks is small and short
lived, thanks to the power of the Hicksian
mechanism. Here it must be acknowledged
that everyone of the Monetarists' criticisms
of early, simple-minded Keynesianism has
proved in considerable measure correct.
With regard to the interest elasticity of
demand for money, post Keynesian develop-
ments in the theory of money, and in particular,
the theoretical contributions of William
Baumol, James Tobin, Merton Miller and
Daniel Orr, point to a modest value of
around one-half to one-third, and empirical
studies (e.g., Stephen M. Goldfeld) are largely
consistent with this prediction (at least until
1975!). Similarly, the dependence of consump-
tion on long run, or life cycle, income and
on wealth, together with the high marginal
tax rates of the postwar period, especially
the corporate tax, and leakages through im-
ports, lead to a rather low estimate of the
multiplier.
Last but not least, both theoretical and
empirical work, reflected in part in econo-
metric models, have largely vindicated the
Monetarist contention that interest effects on
demand are pervasive and substantial. Thus,
in the construction and estimation of the MIT-
Penn-Social Science Research Council (MPS)
econometric model of the U.S., we found
evidence of effects, at least modest, on nearly
every component of aggregate demand. Oneresponse to money supply changes that is
especially important in the MPS, if somewhat
controversial, is via interest rates on the
market value of all assets and thus on con-
sumption.
There is, therefore, substantial agreement
that, in the U.S., the Hicksianmechanism is
fairly effective in limiting the effect of shocks,
and that the response of wages and prices to
excess demand or supply will also work
gradually toward .eliminating largely, if not
totally, any effect on employment. But in the
view of non-Monetarists, the evidence over-
whelmingly supports the conclusion that the
interim response is still of significant magni-
tude and of considerable duration, basically
because the wheels of the offsetting mechanism
grind slowly. To be sure, the first link of the
mechanism, the rise in short term rates, gets
promptly into play and heftily, given the low
money demand elasticity; but most expendi-
tures depend on long-term rates, which
generally respond but gradually, and the
demand response is generally also gradual.
Furthermore, while this response is building
up, multiplier and accelerator mechanisms
work toward amplifying the shock. Finally,
the classical mechanism - the change in real
money supply through prices - has an even
longer lag because of the sluggish response
ofwages to excess demand.
These inferences are supported by simula-
tions with econometric models like the MPS.
Isolating, first, the working of the Hicksian
mechanism by holding prices constant, we
find that a one-percent demand shock, say
a rise in real exports, produces an impact
effect on aggregate output which is barely
more than one percent, rises to a peak of
only about two percent a year later, and then
declines slowly toward a level somewhat
over one-and-one-half percent.
Taking into account the wage-price mechan-
ism hardly changes the picture for the first
year because of its inertia. Thereafter, how-
ever, it becomes increasingly effective so that
a year later the real response is back at the
impact level, and by the end of the third
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year the shock has been fully offset (there-
after output oscillates around zero in a damped
fashion). Money income,· on the other hand,
reaches a peak of over two-and-one-half,and
thenouly by the middle of the second year.
It declines thereafter, and tends eventually
to oscillate around a positive value because
normally·a demand shock requires eventually
a change in interest·rates and hence in velocity
and money income.
These results, which are broadly confirmed
byother econometric models, certainly do not
support the view of a highly unstable economy
in which fiscal policy has powerful and ever-
lasting effects. But neither do they support the
Monetarist view of a highly stable economy
in which shocks hardly make a ripple and the
effects of fiscal policy are puny and fast
vanishing.
C. The Monetarist Evidence and the
St. Louis Quandary
Monetarists, however, have generally been
inclined to question this evidence. They coun-
tered at first with tests bearing on the stability
of velocity and the insignificance of the multi-
plier, which, however, as indicated in my
criticism with Albert Ando (1965), must be
regarded as close to worthless. More recently,
several authors at the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis (Leonall C. Andersen, Keith M.
Carlson, Jerry Lee Jordan), have suggested
that instead of deriving multipliers from the
analytical or numerical solution of an econo-
metric model involving a large number of
equations, anyone of which may be questioned,
they should be estimated directly through
"reduced form" equations by relating the
change in income to current and lagged
changes in some appropriate measure of the
money supply and of fiscal impulses.
The results of the original test, using the
current and but four lagged values ofM}and
of high-employment federal expenditure as
measures of monetary and fiscal· impulses,
turned out to be such as to fill a Mone-
tarist's heart with joy. The contribution of
money, not only current but also lagged, was
large and the coefficients implied a not un-reasonable effect of the order of magnitude
ofthe velocity of circulation, though somewhat
higher. On the other hand, the estimated
coefficients of the fiscal variables seemed to
support fully the Monetarists' claim that their
impact was both small and fleeting: the effect
peaked in but two quarters and was only
around one, and disappeared totally by the
fourth quarter following the change.
These results were immediately attacked on
the .ground that the authors had used the
wrong measure of monetary and fiscal actions,
and it was shown that the outcome was
somewhat sensitive- to alternative measures;
however, the basic nature of the results did
not change, at least qualitatively. In particu-
lar, the outcome does not differ materially,
at least for the original period up to 1969,
if one replaces high-employment outlays with
a variable that might be deemed more suitable,
like government expenditure on goods and
services, plus exports.
These results must be acknowledged as
disturbing for non-Monetarists, for there is
little question that movements in government
purchases and exports are a major source of
demand disturbances; if econometric model
estimates of the response to demand distur-
bances are roughly valid, how can they be so
grossly inconsistent with the reduced form
estimates?
Attempts at reconciling the two have taken
several directions, which are reviewed in an
article with Ando (1976). Our main conclusion,
based on simulation techniques, is that when
income is subject to substantial shocks from
many sources other than monetary and fiscal,
so that these variables account for only a
moderate portion of the variations in income
(in the U.S., it has been of the order of
one-half to two-thirds), then the St. Louis
reduced form method yields highly unstable
and unreliable estimates of the true structure
of the system generating the data.
The crucial role of unreliability and insta-
bility has since been confirmed in more recent
work of Daniel O'Neill in a forthcoming MIT
thesis. He shows, in the first place, that
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different methods of estimation yield widely
different .estimates, including many which
4:learly overstate the expenditure, and under-
state the money multipliers. He further points
out that, given the unreliability of the esti-
mates resulting from multicollinearity and
large residual variance, the relevant question
to ask is not whether these estimates differ
from those obtained by structural estimation,
but whether the difference is statistically
significant, that is, larger than could be
reasonably accounted for by sampling fluc-
tuations.
I have carried out this standard statistical
test using as true response coefficients those
generated by the MPS model quoted earlier.2
I find that, at least when the test is based
on the largest possible sample - the entire
post-Korean period up to the last two very
disturbed years - the difference is totally
insignificant when estimation is in level form
(Fis less than one) and is still not significant
at the five-percent level, when in first
differences.
This test resolves the puzzle by showing
that there really is no puzzle: the two alter-
native estimates of the expenditure multipliers
are not inconsistent, given the margin of
error of the estimates. It implies that one
should accept whichever of the two estimates
is produced by a more reliable and stable
method, and is generally more sensible. To
me, those criteria call, without question, for
adopting the econometric model estimates.
But should there be still some lingering doubt
about this choice, I am happy to be able to
report the results of one final test which I
believe should dispose of the reduced form
estim.ates - at least for a while. Suppose
the 81. Louis estimates of the expenditure
multiplier are closer to God's truth than the
estimates derived through econometric models.
Then it should be the case that if one uses
their coefficients to forecast income beyond
the period of fit, these forecasts should be
appreciably better than those obtained from a
forecasting equation in which the coefficients
of the expenditure variable are set equal tothose obtainedJrom econometric models.
I have carried· out this test, comparing a
reduced form equation fitted to the period
originally used at St. Louis, terminating in
1969 {but reestimated•with•.the·.Iatest.revised
data) with an equation in which thecoeffi-
cients of government expenditure plus ex-
ports were constrained to be those estimated
from .the· MPS,used in the above F test.
The.results are clear cut: the errors using
the reduced form coefficient are not smaller
but on the average substantially larger than
those using MPS multipliers. For the first
four years, terminating at the end of 1973,
the St. Louis equation produces errors which
are distinctly larger in eight quarters, and
smaller in but three, and its squared error is
one-third larger. For the last two years of
turmoil, both equations perform miserably,
though even here the MPS coefficients perform
just a bit better. I have repeated this test
with equations estimated through the first half
of the postwar period, and the results are,
if anything, even more one-sided.
The moral· of the story is pretty clear.
First, reduced form equations relying on
just two exogenous variables are very unre-
liable for.the purpose of estimating structure,
nor are they Particularly accurate for fore~
casting, though per dollar of research expen-
diture tbeyare surprisingly good. Second, if
the St. Louis people want to go on using this
method and wish to secure the best possible
forecast, then they should ask the MPS or any
other large econometric model what coefficients
they should use for government expenditure,
ratber than.trying to estimate them by their
unreliable method.
From the theory and evidence reviewed, we
must tben conclude that opting for a constant
rate of growth of the nominal money supply
can result in a stable economy only in the
absence of significant exogenous shocks. But
obviously the economy has been and will
continue to be exposed to many significant
shocks, coming from such things as war and
peace, and other large changes in government
expenditure, foreign trade, agriculture, tech-
nological progress, population shifts and what
not. The clearest evidence on the importance
of such shocks is provided by our postwar
record with its six recessions.
IV. Tile Record of Stabilization Policies: Stabilizing or Destabilizing
A. Was Postwar Instability Due to Unstable
Money Growth?
At this point, of course, Monetarists will
object that, over the postwar period, we have
not had a constant money growth policy and
will hint that the observed instability can largely
be traced to the instability of money. The
only way of meeting this objection squarely
would be, of course, to rerun history with a
good computer capable of calculating three
percent at thehelm of the Fed.
A more feasible, if less conclusive approach
might be to look for some extended periods
in which the money supply grew fairly smooth-
ly and see how the economy fared. Combing
through our post Korean war history, I have
been able to find just two stretches of several
years in which the growth of the money
stock was·relatively stable, whether one chooses
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to measure stability in terms of percentage
deviations from a constant growth or of dis-
persion of four-quarter changes. It may
surprise some that one such stretch occurred
quite recently and consists of the period of
nearly four years beginning in the first quarter
of 1971 (cf. Modigliani and Papademos,
1976). During this period, the average growth
was quite large, some seven percent, but
it was relatively smooth, generally well
within the six-to eight-percent band. The
average deviation from the mean is about .75
percent. The other such period lasted. from
theheginning of 1953 to the first half of
1957, again a stretch of roughly four years.
In sharp contrast to the most recent period,
the average growth here is quite modest,
only about two percent; but again, most four-
quarter changes fell well within a band oftwo percentage points, and the average de-
viation is again .7. By contrast, during the
remaining 13-year stretch from mid-1957 to
the end of 1970, the variability of money
growth was roughly twice as large if measured
by the average deviation of four-quarter
changes, and some five times larger if meas-
ured by the percentage deviation of the money
stock from a constant growth trend.
How did the economy fare in the two
periods of relatively stable money growth?
It is common knowledge that the period from
1971 to 1974, or from 1972 to 1975 if we
want to allow a one-year lag for money to
do its trick, was distinctly the most unstable
in our recent history, marked by sharp
fluctuations in output and wild gyrations of
the rate of change of prices. As a result,
the average deviation of the four-quarter
changes in output was 3.3 percent, more than
twice as large as in the period of less stable
money growth. But the first stretch was also
marked by well above average instability, with
the contraction of 1954, the sharp recovery of
1955, and the new contraction of 1958, the
sharpest in postwar history except for the
present one. The variability of output is again
50 percent larger than in the middle period.
To be sure, in the recent episode serious
exogenous shocks played a major role in the
development of prices and possibly output,
although the same is not so readily apparent
for the period 1953 to 1958. But, in any
event, such extenuating circumstances are
quite irrelevant to my point; for I am not
suggesting that the stability of money was the
major cause of economic instability - or at
any rate, not yet!! All I am arguing is that
i) there is no basis for the Monetarists'
suggestion that our postwar instability can be
traced to monetary instability - our most
unstable periods have coincided with periods
of relative monetary stability; and ii) stability
of the money supply is not enough to give
us a stable economy, precisely because there
are exogenous disturbances.
Finally, let me mention that I have actually
made an attempt at rerunning history to see
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whether a stable money supply·would stabilize
the economy, though in a way that I readily
acknowledge is much inferior to the real thing,
namely through a simulation with the MPS.
The •experiment, carried out in cooperation
with Papademos, covered the relatively quiet
period· from the beginning of 1959 to the
introduction of' price-wage controls in the
middle of 1971. If one eliminates all major
sources of shocks, e.g., by smoothing Federal
government expenditures, we found, as did
Otto Eckstein in an earlier experiment, that a
stable money growth of three percent per year
does stabilize the economy, as expected. But
when we allowed for all the historical shocks,
the result was that with a constant money
growth the economy was far from stable -
in fact, it was distinctly less stable than actual
experience, by a factor of 50 percent.
B. The Overall Effectiveness of Postwar
Stabilization Policies
But even granted that a smooth money
supply will not produce a very stable world
and that there is, therefore, room for sta-
bilization policies, Monetarists will still argue
that we should nonetheless eschew such poli-
cies. They claim, first, that allowing for un-
predictably variable lags and unforseeable
future shocks, we do not know enough to
successfully design stabilization policies, and
second, that the government would surely be
incapable of choosing the appropriate policies
or be politically willing to provide timely
enforcement. Thus, in practice, stabilization
policies wi!l result in destabilizing the
economy much of the time.
This view is supported by two arguments,
one logical and one empirical. The logical
argument is the one developed in Friedman's
Presidential address (1968). An attempt at
stabilizing the economy at full employment
is bound to be destabilizing because the full
employmentor natural rate is not known with
certainty and is subject to shifts in time;
and if we aim for the incorrect rate, the
result must perforce be explosive inflation or
deflation. By contrast, with a constant money
supply policy, the economy will automaticallyhunt for, and eventually discover, that shifty
natural rate wherever it may be hiding.
This argument, I submit, is nothing but a
debating ploy. It rests on the preposterous
assumption that the only alternative to a con-
stant money growth is the pursuit of a very
precise unemployment target which will be
adhered to indefinitely no matter what, and
that if the target is off in the second decimal
place, galloping inflation is around the corner.
In reality, all that is necessary to pursue
stabilization policies is a rough target range
that includes the warranted rate, itself a range
and not a razor edge; and, of course, respon-
sible supporters of stabilization policies have
long been aware of the fact that the target
range needs to be adjusted in time on the
basis of forseeable shifts in the warranted
range, as well as in the light of emerging
evidence that the current target is not consistent
with price stability. It is precisely for this
reason that I, as weB as many other non-
Monetarists, would side with Monetarists in
strenuous opposition to recent proposals for a
target unemployment rate rigidly fixed by
statute (although there is nothing wrong with
Congress committing itself and the country
to work toward the eventual achievement of
some target unemployment rate through
structural changes rather than aggregate
demand policies).
Clearly, even the continuous updating of
targets cannot guarantee that errors can be
avoided altogether or even that they will be
promptly recognized; and while errors persist,
they will result in some inflationary (or
deflationary) pressures. But the growing infla-
tion to which Friedman refers is, to repeat,
a crawl not a gallop. One may usefully
recall in this connection the experience of
1965-70 referred to earlier, with the further
remark that the existence of excess employ-
ment was quite generally recognized at the
time,and failure to eliminate it resulted over-
whelmingly from political considerations and
not from a wrong diagnosis.3
There remains then only the empirical issue:
have stabilization policies worked in the past
and will they work in the future? Monetar-
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ists think the answer is negative and suggest,
as we have seen, that misguided attempts·at
stabilization, especially through monetary
policies, are responsible for much of the
observed instability. The mainpieceofevi-
dence in support of this contention is· the
GreatDepression, an episode well documented
through the painstaking work of Friedman
and Anna Schwartz, .although still the object
of dispute (see, e.g. Peter Temin). But in
any event, that episode while it may attest
to the power of money, is irrelevant for
present purposes since the contraction of the
money supply was certainly not part of a
comprehensive stabilization program in the
post Keynesian sense.
When we come to the relevant postwar
period, the problem of establishing the success
or failure of stabilization policies is an ex-
tremely taxing one. Many attempts have been
made at developing precise objective tests, but
in my view, none of these is of much value.,
even though I am guilty of having contributed
to them in one of my worst papers (1964).
Even the most ingenious test, that suggested
by Victor Argy, and relying on a comparison
of the variability of income with that of the
velocity of circulation, turns out to be valid
only under highly unrealistic restrictive
assumptions.
Dennis Starleaf and Richard Floyd have
proposed testing the effectiveness of stabiliza-
tion by comparing the stability of money
growth with that of income growth, much as
I have done above for the U.S., except that
they apply their test to a cross section of
industrialized countries. They found that for a
sample of 13 countries, the association was
distinctly positive. But this test is again of
little value. For while a negative association
for a given country, such as suggested by my
U.S. test, does provide some weak indication
that monetary activism helped rather than
hindered, the finding of a positive association
across countries proves absolutely nothing. It
can be readily shown, in fact, that, to the
extent that differential variability of income
reflects differences in the character of theshocks - a most likely circumstance for their
sample - successful stabilization also implies
a positive correlation between the variability
of income and that of money.
But though the search for unambiguous
quantitative tests has so far yielded a meager
crop, there exists a different kind of evidence
in favor of Keynesian stabilization policies
which is impressive, even if hard to quantify.
To quote one of the founding fathers of
business cycle analysis, Arthur Burns, writing
in 1959, "Since 1937 we have had five
recessions, the longest of which lasted only
13 months. There is no parallel for such a
sequence of mild - or such a sequence of
brief - contractions, at least during the past
hundred years in our country." [po 2]. By
now we can add to that list the recessions
of 1961 and 1970.
There is, furthermore, evidence that very
similar conclusions hold for other industrialized
countries which have made use of stabiliza-
tion policies; at any rate that was the pre-
vailing view among participants to an inter-
national conference held in 1967 on the subject,
"Is the business cycle obsolete?" (see Martin
Bronfenbrenner, editor). No one seemed to
question the greater postwar stability of all
W~stern •economies - nor is this surprising
when one recalls that around that time busi-
ness cycle specialists felt so threatened by the
new-found stability that they were arguing for
redefining business cycles as fluctuations in
the rate of growth rather than in the level
of output.
!twas recognized that the reduced severity
of fluctuations might in part reflect structural
changes in the economy and the effect of
stronger built-in stabilizers, inspired, of course,
by the Keynesian analysis. Furthermore, the
greater stability in the U.S., and in other
industrialized countries, are obviously not in-
dependent events. Still, at least as of the time
of that conference, there seemed to be little
question and some evidence that part of the
credit for the greater stability should go to
the conscious and on balance, successful
endeavor at stabilizing the economy.
V. The Case of Supply Shocks and the 1974-76 Episode
A. Was the 1974 Depression Due to Errors
of Commission or Omission?
In pointing out our relative postwar stability
and the qualified success of stabilization poli-
cies, I have carefully defined the postwar
period as ending somewhere in 1973. What
has happened since that has so tarnished the
reputation of economists? In facing this prob-
lem, the first question that needs to be
raised is whether the recent combination of
unprecedented rates of inflation as well as
unemployment must be traced to crimes of
commission or omission. Did our monetary
and fiscal stabilization policies misfire, or did
we instead fail to use them?
We may begin by establishing one point
that has been blurred by Monetarists' blanket
indictments of recent monetary policy: the
virulent explosion that raised the four-quarter
rate of inflation from about 4 percent in
1972 to 6Y2 by the third quarter of 1973,
to n Y2 in 1974, with a peak quarterly rate
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of 13 Y2, can in no way be traced to an ex-
cessive' or to a disorderly, growth of the money
supply. As already mentioned, the average
rate of money growth from the beginning of
1970 to the second half of 1974 was close
to 7 percent. To be sure, this was a high rate
and could be expected sooner or later to
generate an undesirably high inflation - but
how high? Under any reasonable assumption
one cannot arrive at a figure much above
6 percent. This might explain what happened
up to the fall of 1973, but not from the third
quarter of 1973 to the end of 1974, which is
the really troublesome period. Similarly, as
was il1dicated above, the growth of money was
reasonably smooth over this period, smoother
than at any other time in the postwar period,
staying within a two-percent band. Hence,
the debacle of 1974 can just not be traced
to an erratic behavior of money resulting from
a misguided attempt at stabilization.
Should one then conclude that the catas-trophe resulted from too slavish an adherence
to a stable growth rate, forsaking the oppor-
tunity to use monetary policy to stabilize the
economy? In one sense, the answer to this
question must, in my view, be in the affir-
mative. There is ample· ground for holding
that the rapid contraction that set in toward
the end of 1974, on the heels of a slow
decline in the previous three quarters, and
which drove unemployment to its 9-percent
peak, was largely the result of the astronomic
rise in interest rates around the middle of the
year. That rise in turn was the unavoidable
result of the Fed's stubborn refusal to accom-
modate, to an adequate extent, the exogenous
inflationary shock due to oil, by letting the
money supply growth exceed the 6-percent
rate announced at the beginning of the year.
And this despite repeated warnings about that
unavoidable result (e.g., Modigliani, 1974).
Monetarists have suggested that the sharp
recession was not the result of too slow a
monetary growth throughout the year, but
instead of the deceleration that took place in
the last half of 1974 and early 1975. But this
explanation just does not stand up to the
facts. The fall in the quarterly growth of
money in the third and fourth quarters was
puny, especially on the basis of revised figures
now available: from 5.7 percent in the second
to 4.3 and 4.1 - hardly much larger than the
error of estimate for quarterly rates! To be
sure, in the first quarter the growth fell to
.6 percent. But, by then, the violent contrac-
tion was well on its way - between September
1974 and February 1975, industrial production
fell at an annual rate of 25 percent. Further-
more, by the next quarter, monetary growth
had resumed heftily. There is thus no way the
Monetarist proposition can square with these
facts unless their long and variable lags are
so variable that they sometimes turn into
substantial leads. But even then, by anybody's
model, a one-quarter dip in the growth of
money could not have had a perceptible effect.
B. What Macro Stabilization Policies Can
Accomplish, and How
But recognizing that the adherence to a
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stable money growth path through much of
1974 bears a major responsibility for the
sharp contraction does not per se establish
that the policy was mistaken. The reason is
that the shock that hit the system in 1973-74
was riot the usual type of demand shock which
we have gradually learned to cope with, more
or less adequately. It·was, instead, a supply
or price shock, coming from a cumulation of
causes, largely external. This poses an alto-
gether different stabilization problem. In par-
ticular, in the case of demand shocks, there
exists, in principle, an ideal policy which avoids
all social costs, namely to offset completely
the shock thus, at the same time, stabilizing
employment and the price level. There may be
disagreement as to whether this target can be
achieved and how, but not about the target
itself.
But in the case of supply shocks, there is
no miracle cure - there is no macro policy
which can both maintain a stable price level
and keep employment at its natural rate. To
maintain stable prices in the face of the
exogenous price shock, say a rise in import
prices, would require a fall in all domestic
output prices; but we know of no macro
pOlicy by which domestic prices can be made
to fall except by creating enough slack, thus
putting downward pressure on wages. And the
amount of slack would have to be substantial
in view of the sluggishness of wages in the
face of unemployment. If we do not offset
the exogenous shock completely, then the
initial burst, even if activated by an entirely
transient rise in some prices, such as a once
and •for all deterioration in the terms of
trade, will give rise to further increases, as
nominal wages rise in a vain attempt at
preserving real wages; this secondary reaction
too can only be cut short by creating slack.
In short, once a price shock hits, there is
no way of returning to the initial equilibrium
except after a painful period of both above
equilibrium employment and inflation.
There are, of course, in principle, policies
other than aggregate demand management to
which we might turn, and which are enticingin view of the unpleasant alternatives offered
by demand management. But so far such
policies, at least those of the wage-price con-
trol variety, have proved disappointing. The
design of better alternatives is probably the
greatest challenge presently confronting those
interested in stabilization. However, these
policies fall outside my present concern. Within
the realm of aggregate demand management,
the only choice open to society is the cruel
one between alternative feasible paths of infla-
tion and associated paths of unemployment,
and the best the macroeconomist can offer
is policies designed to approximate the chosen
path.
In light of the above, we may ask: is it
conceivable that a constant rate of growth
of the money supply will provide a satisfactory
response to price shocks in the sense of giving
rise to an unemployment-inflation path to
which the country would object least?
C. The Monetarist Prescription: Or
Constant Money Growth Once More
The Monetarists are inclined to answer this
question affirmatively, if not in terms of the
country's preferences, at least in terms of the
preferences they think it should have. This
is evidenced by their staunch support of a
continuation of the six-percent or so rate of
growth through 1974, 1975 and 1976.
Their reasoning seems to go along the
following lines. The natural rate hypothesis
implies that the rate of inflation can change
only when employment deviates from the
natural rate. Now suppose we start from the
natural rate and some corresponding steady
rate of inflation, which without loss of gen-
erality can be assumed as zero. Let there
be an exogenous shock which initially lifts
the rate of inflation, say, to 10 percent. If
the Central Bank, by accommodating this
price rise, keeps employment at the natural
rate, the new rate of 10 percent will also
be maintained and will in fact continue for-
ever, as long as the money supply accommo-
dates it. The only way to eliminate inflation
is to increase unemployment enough, above
the natural rate and for a long enough time,
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so that the cumulated reduction of inflation
takes·us back to zero. There will of course
be •many possible unemployment paths that
will accomplish this. So the next question is:
Which is the least undesirable?
The Monetarist answer seems to be - and
here I confess that attribution becomes diffi-
cult - that it does not make much difference
because, to a first approximation, the cumu-
lated amount of unemployment needed to
unwind inflation is independent of the path.
If we take more unemployment early, we need
to take less later, and conversely. But then it
follows immediately that the specific path of
unemployment that would be generated by a
constant money growth is, if not better, at
least as good as any other. Corollary: a
constant growth of money is a satisfactory
answer to supply shocks just as it is to demand
shocks- as well as, one may suspect, to
any other conceivable illness, indisposition or
disorder.
D. Why Constant Money Growth Cannot
Be the Answer
This reasoning is admirably simple and
elegant, but it suffers from several flaws.
The first one is a confusion between the
price level and its rate of change. With an
unchanged constant growth of the nominal
money stock, the system will settle back into
equilibrium not when the rate of inflation
is back to zero but only when, in addition,
the price level itself is back to its initial
level. This means that when inflation has
finally returned back to the desired original
rate, unemployment cannot also be back to
the original level but will instead remain above
it as long as is necessary to generate enough
deflation to offset the earlier cumulated infla-
tion. I doubt that this solution would find
many supporters and for a good reason; it
amounts to requiring that none of the burden
of the. price shock should fall on the holder
of long-term money fixed contracts - such
as debts - and that all other sectors of
society should shoulder entirely whatever cost
is necessary to insure this result. But if, as
seems to be fairly universally agreed, the socialtarget is instead to return the system to the
original rate of inflation - zero in our
example - then the growth of the moneY
supply cannot be kept constant. Between tne
time the shock hits. and the time inflation
has returned to the long-run level, there must
be an additional increase in money supply
by as much as the price level or by the
cumulant of inflation over the path.
A second problem.with the Monetarists'
argument is that·it implies a rather special
preference function that depends only on
cumulated unemployment. And, last but not
least, it requires the heroic assumption that
the Phillips curve be not only vertical in the
long run but also linear in the short run,
an assumption that does not seem consistent
with empirically estimated curves. Dropping
this last assumption has the effect that, for
any given social preference, there will be, in
general, a unique optimal path. Clearly, for
this path to be precisely that generated by
a constant money growth, would require a
miracle - or some sleight of the invisible
hand!
Actually, there is ground for holding that
the unemployment path generated by a con-
stant money growth, even if temporarily raised
to take care of the first flaw, could not
possibly be close to an optimal. This conclu-
sion is based on an analysis of optimal
paths, relying on the type of linear welfare
function that appears to underlie the Mone-
tarists' argument, and which is also a straight-
forward generalization of Okun's famous
"economic discomfort index." That index
(which according to Michael Lovell appears
to have some empirical support) is the sum
of unemployment and inflation. The index
used in my analysis is a weighted average
of the cumulated unemployment and cumulated
inflation over the path. The weights express
the relative social concern for inflation versus
unemployment.
Using this index, it has been shown in a
forthcoming thesis of Papademos that, in
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general, the optimum policy calls for raising
unemployment at once to a certain critical
level and keeping it there until inflation has
substantially abated. The critical level depends
on. the. nature.·of the Phillips. C\.irye and the
relative weights, but does not depend signi-
ficantly on the initial shock - as long as it
is .appreciable. To provide an idea of the
order of magnitudes involved, if one relies
on the estimate of the Phillips curve reported
in a joint paper with Papademos (1975),
which is fairly close to vertical, and uses
Okun's weights, one finds that i) at the present
time, the non-inflationary rate of unemploy-
ment corresponding to a 2-percent rate of
inflation can be estimated at 5.6 percent, and
ii) the optimal response to a large exogenous
price shock consists in increasing unemploy-
ment from 5.6 to only about 7 percent.
That level is to be maintained until inflation
falls somewhat below 4 percent; it should then
be reduced slowly until inflation gets to 2Y2
(which is estimated to take a couple of years),
and rapidly thereafter. If, on the other hand,
society were to rate inflation twice as costly
as unemployment, the initial unemployment
rate becomes just over 8, though the path to
final equilibrium is then shorter. These results
seem intuitively sensible and quantitatively
reasonable, providing further justification for
the assumed welfare function, with its appeal-
ing property of summarizing preferences into
a single readily understandable number.
One important implication of the nature of
the optimum path described above is that a
constant money growth could not possibly
be optimal while inflation is being squeezed
out of the system, regardless of the relative
weights attached to unemployment and infla-
tion. It would tend to be prevailingly too
small for some initial period and too large
thereafter.
One must thus conclude that the case for
a constant money growth is no more tenable
in the case of supply shocks than it is in
the case of demand shocks.VI. Conclusion
To summarize, the Monetarists have made
a valid and most valuable contribution in
establishing that our economy is far less
unstable than the early Keynesians pictured
it and in rehabilitating the role of money
as a determinant of aggregate demand. They
are wrong, however, in going as far as
asserting that the economy is sufficiently
shock-proof that stabilization policies are not
needed. They have also made an important
contribution in pointing out that such policies
might in fact prove destabilizing. This criti-
cism has had a salutary effect on reassessing
what stabilization policies can and should do,
and on trimming down fine-tuning ambitions.
But their contention that postwar fluctuations
resulted from an unstable money growth or
that stabilization policies decreased rather
than increased stability just does not stand up
to an impartial examination of the postwar
record of the U.S. and other industrialized
countries. Up to 1974, these policies have
helped to keep the economy reasonably stable
by historical standards, even though one can
certainly point to some occasional failures.
The serious deterioration in economic sta-
bility since 1973 must be attributed in the first
place to the novel nature of the shocks that
hit us, namely supply shocks. Even the best
possible aggregate demand management cannot
offset such shocks without a lot of unem-
ployment together with a lot of .inflation.
But, in addition, demand management was far
from the best. This failure must be attributed
in good measure to the fact that we had
little experience or even an adequate concep-
tual framework to deal with such shocks; but
at least from my reading of the record, it
was also the result of failure to use stabili-
zation policies, including too slavish adherence
to the Monetarists' constant money growth
prescription.
We must, therefore, categorically reject the
Monetarist appeal to turn back the clock 40
years by discarding the basic message of the
General Theory. We should instead concentrate
our efforts in an endeavor to make stabili-
zation policies even more effective in the future
than they have been in the past.
Footnotes
IThus, in a logarithmic regression of private nonfarm
hourly compensation deflated by the private nonfarm
deflatM on output per man-hour, time, and private non-
farm employment, after correcting for first-order serial
correlation, the latter variable has a coefficient of .17
and a I-ratio of 5. Similar though less significant results
were found for manufacturing. If employment is replaced
by the change in nominal compensation, its coefficient
is .40 with a I-ratio of 6.5. Finally, if the change in
compensation is replaced by the change in price, despite
the negative bias from error of measurement of price,
the coefficient of this variable is only -.09 with an
entirely insignificant I-ratio of .7. The period after 1973
has been omitted from the tests as irrelevant for our
purposes, since the inflation was driven primarily by an
exogenous price shock rather than by excess demand. As
a result of the shock, prices, and to some extent wages,
rose rapidly while employment and real wages fell.
Thus, the addition of the last two years tends to increase
spuriously the positive association between real wages and
employment, and to decrease that between real wages
and the change in nominal wages or prices.
44
2For the purpose of the test, coefficients were scaled
down by one-third to allow for certain major biases in
measured government expenditure for present purposes
(mainly the treatment of military procurement on a delivery
rather than work progress basis, and the inclusion of
direct military expenditure abroad).
3Friedman's logical argument against stabilization poli-
cies and in favor of a constant money growth rule is,
I submit, much like arguing to a man from St. Paul
wishing to go to New Orleans on important business
that he would be a fool to drive and should instead
get himself a tub and drift down the Mississippi:
that way he can be pretty sure that the current will
eventually get him to his destination; whereas, if he
drives, he might make a wrong turn and, before he
notices he will be going further and further away from
his destination and pretty soon he may end up in
Alaska, where he will surely catch pneumonia and he
may never get to New Orleans!REFERENCES
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